A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea by Michael Dooley et al.
A Framework for Exchange
Rate Policy in Korea
300-4 Yomgok-Dong, Seocho-Gu, Seoul 137-747, Korea





























































































KIEPA Framework for Exchange Rate Policy
in Korea
KIEP Working Paper 02-02
Michael Dooley Rudi Dornbusch Yung Chul Park 
March 2002A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea
Michael Dooley, Rudi Dornbusch and Yung Chul Park
*
I. Introduction
The monetary policy and exchange rate regime that served Korea well for many
years ended in crisis in 1997. The regime that collapsed was characterized by a tightly
managed nominal exchange rate and domestic financial markets that were controlled by
the government and largely closed to international transactions. The practical question for
authorities over the next few years is what monetary and exchange rate regime will best
promote the objectives of maintaining economic and financial stability as financial
markets are liberalized.
Our basic proposal is that the powerful policy tool, interest rate policy, be used to
attain a "flexible" inflation target.  Flexibility in this context means that the authorities
also care about short-run fluctuations in domestic output and employment. The less
powerful policy tool, sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market, would be
used to limit day to day changes in exchange rates.
We argue that the government should continue to be an important participant in
the foreign exchange market but not attempt to establish a level for the exchange rate.
Our proposal will involve intervention that is triggered by exchange rate volatility but
constrained by an announced target for the government's overall net foreign asset position.
The objective of this regime is to allow the government to participate in the foreign
exchange market in a way that contributes to economic stability and promotes the
development of the private sector's participation in foreign exchange and financial
markets.2
The 1997 crisis was, in our view, caused by the inability of the exchange rate
regime to coexist with a more open and competitive financial market.  There are many
historical precedents for the sequence of financial liberalization, crisis, and reform of
exchange rate and monetary policy arrangements.  Industrial countries experienced a very
similar sequence in the early 1970s and, like Korea today, were forced to adapt to the
new reality with very limited information about how the new system would work.
The question now is how exchange rate arrangements should evolve in order to
insure a sustained economic recovery.  It is important that the interim regime promote
economic stability and growth and that it be consistent with a wide range of monetary
regimes that might become available in the future.
At present the Korean government has considerable discretion in managing the
exchange rate and financial policy.  In order to improve policy transparency and
credibility, market intervention  should be carried out according to a set of rules.  The
rules proposed in this study have the following three components:
(i) Sterilized intervention  – changes in the composition of the central bank’s
assets between domestic assets (won) and foreign assets (denominated in foreign
currencies) will be relied on to moderate volatility in daily nominal exchange
rates in excess of three percentage points against a basket of the dollar, Euro, and
yen.  This rule could be extended to resist cumulative movements of more than 6
percent in one week.
 
(ii) A target level for net foreign assets (foreign exchange reserve net of foreign
currency liabilities and derivative positions) would be established.  Deviations in
the level of reserves generated in limiting exchange rate volatility would be
eliminated over a six-month period according to an announced rule.  The target
level of reserves should be large enough to meet a bank run initially, but with
accumulation of the experience in managing reserves, the level could be adjusted
to balance the cost and benefit of maintaining a large stock of foreign assets.
(iii) A flexible inflation-targeting rule would be established.  A short-term interest
rate would be used as an intermediate target to stabilize output in the short-run
and inflation in the long-run
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In the current situation the government has considerable discretion in managing
the exchange rate and monetary policy.  In our view, rules are needed for three reasons.
First, Korea's exchange rate policy is important to its trading partners.  It is necessary,
therefore, to effectively communicate what the policy is and how it will be carried out.
Because the government will be an active participant in the foreign exchange market, it is
crucial that its intentions be clear both to private market participants and to its trading
partners.  One of the attractions of the adjustable peg system was that the government's
objectives were clear and summarized by the target for the nominal exchange rate.
Indeed it is easy to forget that the Bretton Woods system that served the industrial
countries well before their financial markets were liberalized was initially seen as a way
to avoid competitive devaluation.
Second, the success of a regime that accepts some level of nominal exchange rate
volatility depends on the private sector's ability and willingness to provide liquid and
efficient foreign exchange markets.  Markets can deal with volatility if market
participants are free to profit from trading strategies that exploit volatility.  This is more
likely if the government's intervention in the market is limited. The market's ability to
limit movements in exchange rates away from fundamentals requires clear and steady
economic policies.  Clearly, markets are likely to function better if the government's
objectives and policies are clearly understood and consistently pursued.
Finally, in the absence of a tightly controlled nominal exchange rate the
authorities will need to explain their monetary policy objectives and performance in
terms of some variable or set of variables other than the exchange rate.  We argue below
that a flexible target for inflation has many advantages for Korea.
The rules we propose have three components.  Changes in the composition of the
central bank's assets between domestic assets (denominated in won) and foreign assets
(denominated in foreign currencies) would allow the central bank to participate in the
foreign exchange market without altering the monetary base.  The objective of this
participation, sometimes referred to as sterilized intervention, would normally be to
moderate volatility in daily nominal exchange rates in excess of one to three percentage
points against a basket of the big three currencies.  The rule could be extended to resist4
cumulative movements of more than 3-6 percent in one week.  This rule would be
symmetric for appreciation and depreciation of the won as long as net reserves remain
within a normal range.  The authorities would not be obliged to intervene if they
considered large changes in the rate an appropriate reaction to changes in the economic
environment.
A target level for net foreign assets (foreign exchange reserves net of foreign
currency liabilities and derivative positions) would be established.  The statistical
definition of net foreign assets follows directly from the objective for intervention.  In
altering its net foreign asset position the government is imposing a mirror image change
in the private sector's net currency exposure.  The basic idea is that if private market
participants are forced to take a larger net position in a currency they will be less likely to
push the exchange rate to levels that are likely to be reversed.  Standard accounting
practice for measuring currency exposure for private entities are comprehensive in that
they consider conventional financial assets and liabilities as well as derivative positions
that affect the financial net worth of the firm when exchange rates change.  These
accounting practices are easily adapted to measure the net foreign currency position of
the government.
Altering the intervention rule would reverse deviations in the level of reserves
generated in limiting exchange rate volatility.  If reserves deviate by more than 25
percent from their target level the intervention rule would become asymmetric.  If
reserves fall (rise) by more than 25 percent subsequent daily depreciation (appreciation)
of the won up to 3 percent would be permitted.  If reserves deviate by more than 50
percent the rule would be again adjusted to 3 percent in the direction that moves away
from their target level and 0.5 percent in the direction that moves reserves toward their
target level.
An asymmetric intervention rule could generate losses for the government.
Clearly if the public knows that the government will be a net seller of domestic currency
bonds in order to rebuild reserves this will, other things equal, depress the exchange rate.
But this is appropriate since the initial intervention artificially supported the currency.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the exchange rate will ever rise to levels that make5
the intervention profitable.  But there is no one way bet typical of a regime in which the
authorities are obliged to defend a currency peg.
We would expect that in establishing its target the government would balance the
cost of maintaining a stock of liquid foreign assets against the benefit of being able to
mitigate the effects of swings in private capital flows. In the early days of an interim
regime the desired stock of reserves might be quite large by historical standards.  Recent
experience suggests that net reserves of 50 percent of GDP would not be unreasonable.
Changes in the level of the central bank’s total assets, and therefore the monetary
base, would allow the central bank to determine a short-term interest rate in Korean
financial markets.  The practice of using a short-term interest rate as an intermediate
target to stabilize output in the short run and inflation in the long run has become widely
established in both industrial and developing countries.  Inflation targeting would be fully
consistent with the objective of liberalizing and strengthening domestic financial markets.
          
II Policy Challenges
II - 1 The Current Account, Net Debt and Capital Flows
We argue above that a simple set of rules for intervention can go a long way
toward insuring that Korea's financial market will develop and that Korea's trading
partners will not see the exchange regime as injuring their interests.  A necessary
condition for such rules to be credible is that the current account or, what is the same
thing, the change in net debt of the Korean economy generated by private investment
decisions must be acceptable to the government of Korea.
The logic of this proposition is simple and unavoidable.  If the private sector is
free to borrow and lend, market forces will determine the level of the exchange rate, net
capital flows and the current account balance.  As a participant in international capital
markets the Korean government can mitigate the volatility of this process but it cannot
hold back the tide of international capital flows unless, of course, it decides to reimpose
controls.6
Policy makers are sometimes impatient with this constraint arguing, for example,
that it is not politically feasible to allow the country to fall into debt or to give up the
benefits of export-led growth.  We do not believe that a macro policy regime can resolve
this potential conflict.  The constraint on the government's objective for the current
account is not a "theory".  It is an identity.  If the private sector determines the scale and
direction of net capital flows free of controls the government cannot also determine the
scale and direction of net capital flows.
We recognize that private capital inflows to emerging markets have not always
been  beneficial.  Financial crises have been a frequent and painful feature of the
international monetary system in recent years.  The obvious welfare costs of crises has
led to a general reevaluation of strategies for opening repressed financial systems to
international competition.  There is a growing recognition that greater reliance on market
forces to coordinate financial markets has apparently contradictory implications for
policy makers.  On the one hand, liberalization reduces the direct role of the government
in domestic credit markets. State owned or directed financial systems have done a poor
job of allocating resources, and this blueprint for economic development has been
decisively, and rightly, rejected by the government of Korea.  It is the complexity of
credit allocation that gives market mechanisms the decisive edge over planning.
On the other hand, we have ample evidence that badly structured and poorly
regulated private financial markets can also misallocate resources.  The limitations and
fragility of private credit markets in emerging markets should not have been a surprise.
Credit markets in industrial countries are highly regulated and there is a very large and
sophisticated literature on the distortions to private incentives that make this regulation
necessary.  A balanced assessment of these arguments suggests to us that successful
liberalization of credit markets will severely limit the government's direct participation in
financial markets and at the same time require a substantial expansion of the
government's role in supervision and prudential regulation.  In the transition to a fully
liberalized domestic financial system, restraints on the liability management of resident7
financial and nonfinancial institutions may be a useful component of the government's
overall strategy.  In some circumstances such limitations might take the form of controls
and taxes on international capital flows.
An overriding short term challenge facing policy makers in emerging markets is
to establish policy regimes that are immune from financial crises.  The unhappy fact
seems to be that a stable macroeconomic environment may be necessary but not
sufficient to coax the desired outcomes from liberalized financial systems. But we want
to emphasize the idea that monetary policy should not be assigned the task of offsetting
capital movements generated by distorted or inefficient private incentives. Moreover,
sterilized intervention  may be useful over short time horizons but in most cases
intervention "papers over" the problem without altering the incentives behind private
capital flows.  As a result the authorities can offset private capital flows for a while but it
is clear that this encourages more private capital flows.
For similar reasons we are also unconvinced that fiscal policy is an effective
policy tool for influencing private capital flows.  While fiscal policy might in very special
circumstances be used to influence net capital flows we do not believe that the
government's net debt position should be determined by developments in international
capital markets.
Our conclusion is that if there is a problem with private capital flows the
government should directly limit such transactions, and at the same time, work to alter
the incentives that may have generated capital flows not in the country's interests.  A
liberalized financial system means that although the government is not directly setting
quantitative restrictions on capital flows it will have to work very hard to insure that net
private capital flows are not distorted and are consistent with prudent financial
management of private investors and debtors8
II - 2 Volatility
Free financial markets are volatile.  It would be very helpful therefore if the
authorities would clearly link their objective for a market-oriented financial system to
their acceptance of an appropriate amount of volatility in financial prices, including
exchange rates.  The appropriate level of volatility, in turn, depends on the ability of
financial and nonfinancial institutions to adjust to this new environment. Although we
believe that private market participants will eventually provide the stabilizing speculation
needed to insure the performance of a market-determined system, these institutions are
not yet fully developed in Korea. There is no doubt that the ultimate success or failure of
this interim regime will depend on the behavior of the private sector.
What can the government do to promote stabilizing speculation?  The most
important ingredient is to allow substantial volatility from day to day in exchange rates.
This provides the profit incentives for speculators to smooth rates and the incentive for
other market participants to hedge exposures.
The initial weakness of corporate and bank balance sheets following the 1997
crisis has made it difficult for firms to adjust to highly volatile exchange rates.  An
important tradeoff is that some measure of volatility is  necessary  to make private
speculation profitable.  But excessive volatility will be a serious problem for financial
and nonfinancial institutions with weak balance sheets.
The key to this problem, however, is how balance sheets evolve over time.  This
will be strongly influenced by expectations about intervention policy. If the authorities
are perceived as having an objective for the level of the nominal exchange rate, private
investors will structure their balance sheets to take advantage of such a guarantee.  There
is no need for a private firm to hedge dollar liabilities if the government is expected to
use its reserves to liquidate all or most of the private sector's dollar liabilities at some
floor level for the exchange rate.
The tendency for the private sector to increase its vulnerability to exchange rate
changes when it believes that the authorities have an objective for the level of the
exchange rates is a very important reason for establishing rules for floating.  If the private
sector believes that they are insured against depreciation they will borrow in foreign
currencies and this will, in fact, make it difficult for the government to stand by when9
there is downward pressure on the currency.  The rules suggested here would have two
positive effects.  First, it will send a clear message to the private sector that they are
responsible for the financial risks they take on.  Second, when the policy is tested by a
fall in the exchange rate the government has a clear policy to stick to.
It is never easy to stand by when markets punish firms that have made bad
decisions.  In our view the only way to insure that private risks are avoided is to allow
firms to fail.  This, in turn, requires efficient procedures for liquidating firms that make
bad decisions.  Many observers have argued that this "credit culture" will be difficult to
implement in Korea and other emerging markets.  We agree but would add that, if this is
really the case, liberalized financial markets cannot work. The decision to move to
market-determined financial markets is the decision to strictly limit the government's
intervention designed to save individual firms from the market's judgment.
   
II - 3.  Exports
One of the most difficult problems with volatility is that export industries that
have enjoyed the protection of managed exchange rates are also not well prepared to cope
with greater volatility in exchange rates.  The key question is whether or not exporters
will adapt to the new system and at what cost.  Experience in other countries suggests
that exchange rate volatility has not reduced the growth of international trade.
But this does not mean that exchange rate volatility will be welcome by exporters.
Export industries will carefully observe the government's intervention behavior in order
to assess their risks in concentrating on export markets and upon hedging their exposure
to exchange rate changes.  No business that is accustomed to protection from uncertainty
by the government will welcome a more volatile environment. If the government is
believed to have an objective to resist appreciation of the currency, firms will exploit the
guarantee by focusing on production for export and by not hedging the domestic currency
value of receipts. The success of an interim regime will depend on the authorities' ability
to balance the needs of exporters and other market participants.
Small and medium sized businesses do not have credit ratings that allow them to
use many hedging techniques.  In most hedging instruments there is significant
counterpart risk and this risk makes participation expensive and, in many cases,10
impossible.  Options are a good alternative since the firm pays a fee and does not need
further credit.  But the option exchange itself must be well capitalized to ensure
participants that large rate movements will not generate default.  The authorities could
participate in the options exchange perhaps through a capital infusion
II - 4.  The Optimal Stock of Gross Reserves
The optimal stock of gross reserves, or the ratio or gross reserves to GDP, is
difficult to quantify.  In focusing on the net foreign currency position of the government
we have left the optimal composition of gross assets and liabilities and derivative
positions in the background.  Suppose, for example, that the Bank of Korea borrows
dollars and invests in liquid dollar assets.  Gross reserves have increased but the
government’s net foreign currency position has not changed.  Thus we would not call this
intervention.  In fact, the rules for floating outlined above put no constraint on the level of
gross reserve assets, gross foreign currency liabilities, and derivative positions but only
on the government’s net exposure.  Nevertheless "borrowing in advance of need" might
help stabilize market expectations and discourage speculative runs on the currency.  It
follows that, within the guidelines set out here, the government is free to balance the
advantages of a borrowed war chest against the carrying cost of borrowing long in order
to lend short.
Our main point here is that the government of Korea has a legitimate need for
reserves and an accumulation of large stocks of gross or net reserves is not a threat to the
interests of other countries.  To the contrary, an appropriate stock of reserves can be an
important contribution to the stability of the international monetary system.  The problem
is that this objective is difficult to distinguish from the objective of trying to control the
level of the exchange rate or the current account balance.  This is a legitimate concern
both for foreign governments and private investors.
II - 5.  A Safety Valve, Concerted Intervention
Allowing exchange rate volatility also opens up the way for noise traders, or
worse, for those that would attempt to manipulate the rate of a small open economy for
their own advantage.  The importance of such behavior in practice has been debated for11
as long as there have been markets.  We will not settle such matters here much less the
more difficult question of the tradeoff between market-determined prices and the costs of
destabilizing speculation.  But we do need to provide a mechanism for the authorities to
react to such behavior when they are convinced it is dominating markets.
It follows that a prudent regime incorporates a safety valve that allows
governments to step in and take a strong stand concerning the appropriate level of the
exchange rate.  Such interventions should be infrequent and, to insure that governments'
participation in the market is decisive, it should be the result of a formal agreement
among governments, perhaps through regional swap agreements or the BIS.  There is
some evidence that concerted intervention by governments of industrial countries has
been effective in stabilizing exchange rates and we see no reason for limiting such policy
moves to industrial countries.
If the exchange rate is clearly being manipulated or if a movement in one
direction is thought to be a speculative bubble, the governments involved should be able
to agree to a concerted intervention and to share the exchange rate risks associated with
such an intervention.  In the case of Korea, bilateral negotiations with the big three would
not be practical but consultation with other Asian governments would be an attractive
alternative.
This consultation process is crucial in defusing a political reaction from trading
partners.  It would also signal the private sector that the intervention is funded by deep
pockets and is likely to be successful in stabilizing the exchange rate. The reserve targets
would be relaxed but not eliminated following concerted intervention.  If fact, it would be
much easier to gather agreement for such an intervention if the terms for unwinding each
government's position were set out in advance.
III  Inflation Targeting
III - 1  Overview
By assigning the currency composition of the government's net assets to smooth
exchange rates we have left free the more powerful policy, namely changes in the12
monetary base and associated changes in short-run interest rates.  The benefits of freeing
this important tool depend on a coherent policy framework.  Our suggestion is that
flexible inflation targeting with an intermediate interest rate target would be appropriate
for Korea.  This is an appealing regime for several reasons.  First it allows an "additional"
role for the exchange rate in policy making.  Nominal exchange rate changes have
predictable effects on subsequent inflation.  It follows that the appropriate policy
response to exchange rate depreciation is a tightening of monetary conditions.  As
emphasized above, the central bank is not backed into a corner of defending a given level
for the exchange rate but is, nevertheless, expected to react to mitigate the inflationary
and deflationary effects of changes in nominal exchange rates.
Second, by clearly communicating its inflation objectives and forecasts the
government provides a clear justification for its nominal interest rate instrument.  This
will allow the government to build a track record and, in that way, increase its credibility.
Third, the fact that the government will certainly miss its inflation target from
time to time is actually an advantage of the system because it provides an opportunity for
the government to explain its understanding of what part of the forecast went wrong and
why.  It is our view that credibility does not come from the particular nominal target
chosen.  Credibility comes from the demonstration that the government has a consistent
policy framework and can explain and learn from past errors in the context of that
framework.
The operating procedure associated with inflation targeting is simple to formulate
and communicate to the private sector.  The first step is to calculate a "normal" real
interest rate that is neutral with respect to the business cycle.  The second is to quantify
an inflation forecast conditional on policy.  Third, the inflation forecast plus some part of
the percentage difference between the expected and desired inflation rate is then added to
the normal rate to obtain the short-term interest rate target.  There are many judgments to
be made in this procedure and a great deal of discretion and judgement can be
incorporated into the process.
Svensson (1998) provides an explicit model of a small open economy and
evaluates alternative inflation targeting procedures in the context of the model.  There are
important issues that would have to be resolved before such a model could be applied to13
Korea. In particular the fact that the exchange rate has an immediate effect on output and
prices in a small open economy has to be taken carefully into account in designing the
regime.  These important questions are beyond the scope of this paper but we do provide
a very simple description of how our policy regime would react to shocks to the economy
in appendix I. 
1
We believe that there are no serious technical barriers to successful inflation
targeting in Korea.  Moreover, the regime has several advantages.  First, the interest rate
is clearly visible to the private sector every day.  Second, when errors occur the
authorities have a simple framework within which errors can be decomposed and can
communicate how the procedure will be modified to insure better future performance.
Third, and most important, this procedure requires the central bank to pursue the one
policy objective it has the power to achieve in the long run, the rate of inflation.
III -2.  Credibility and Inflation Targeting
Some observers have argued that exchange rate regimes similar to that described
above are unlikely to serve the interests of emerging-market countries.  Calvo (2000) and
Calvo and Reinhart (2000b), for example, have argued that there are good reasons for
countries that started out floating following a crisis to quickly return to a de facto fixed
rate regime.  This tendency has been called "fear of floating" and is a clear empirical
regularity among developing countries.  The more difficult question is why this has been
such a common phenomenon and what, if any, lessons are applicable for Korea.
One approach is to argue that floating exchange rates are, in fact, not optimal for
emerging markets.  This argument is based on the idea that a fixed exchange rate is the
only credible and verifiable nominal anchor for monetary policy in developing countries.
If this is true then there are certainly strong reasons for adopting a fixed exchange rate.
Our view is that this assumption does not fit Korea well at all.  Countries with histories of
high inflation may find it difficult to convince the private sector that they can be trusted
to hit an inflation target.  But the government of Korea, we believe, would be more
credible if it announced an inflation target.  An inflation target would provide a superior
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anchor for private expectations about monetary policy in Korea because the relationship
between the monetary base, short-term interest rates and inflation is much better
understood than the relationship between the exchange rate and any variable over which
the authorities have control.  It is exactly a commitment to defend an exchange rate that
has become, in the market's view, over or under valued that makes an adjustable peg
regime unstable.  Even in inflation-prone countries such as Brazil and Mexico inflation
targeting has been quite successful in stabilizing inflationary expectations.  Moreover,
uncertainty about the level of the exchange rate that is consistent with price stability
means that a commitment to a fixed exchange rate might destabilize the price level.
IV Alternative Intermediate Regimes
Although our preferred regime does not call for an important role for the level of
the nominal exchange rate we recognize that there are good arguments for a regime in
which the exchange rate plays a more central role.  In this section we discuss regimes that
capture the important elements of such alternatives.  .
The central focus of the basket-band-crawl (BBC) regime is three-fold.  First and
foremost, it is designed to maintain competitiveness.  Over time, the exchange rate will
depreciate at a pace such that the countries’ inflation differential (beyond what is induced
by the Balassa-Samuelson-Komyia effect) is offset by nominal depreciation.  Second,
where there is no dominant trading partner, the reference point is a basket of currencies
rather than a single reference currency.  Third, there is room for exchange rate
fluctuations to free up, within limits, domestic monetary policy and to have some market-
based signaling role for exchange rates.  Clearly, the regime is not a panacea: domestic
monetary and fiscal policies matter for performance, but the arrangement is sufficiently
stabilizing for capital markets to elicit substantially stabilizing speculation.
When inflation rates are high, fixed or unchanging nominal exchange rates can
not be sustained.  This leads to the first part of the proposal: crawling.  The notion of
crawling was first practiced in Latin America.  It clearly involves a trade-off: indexing15
the exchange rate means inflation is more nearly perpetuating itself than coming down
under the force of a (fixed) nominal exchange rate anchor.  However, in exchange, there
is no loss of competitiveness and the associated risk of recurrent devaluation crises
declines.  The higher the rate of inflation, the more important the emphasis on the crawl.  
The second part of the scheme is the basket feature: because trade with the dollar
block and with Europe is a significant portion of Asian commerce, the rate regime should
be diversified.  In that way another source of major swings in competitiveness -- external
currency movements rather than domestic inflation -- is contained.  Any trend inflation
and productivity adjustment aside, external currency changes affect the central parity. For
the Korean Won, weights might be 0.3 for the US and the ERM and 0.6 for Japan.
Whenever the dollar appreciates 10 percent on the Yen and the Euro, there is an
offsetting appreciation of the Won by 3 percent on these currencies.  As a result,
weighted average competitiveness is preserved: a gain in the dollar markets of 7 percent
and a loss in the Euro and Yen markets of 3 percent.  The adjustment is clearly not
neutral across firms, but it is the best that can be done under the circumstances.  Firms
can go further in seeking stability by using forward contracts.  From an inflation point of
view, the rule maintains the stability of the average price level.
The basket feature does not mean that there is a need to intervene in all reference
currencies.  In practice, the foreign exchange market is run in terms of one of the
reference currencies, say the dollar.  The central dollar rate then is adjusted in terms of
the trend factors and the corrections deriving from external rate movements among the
basket currencies.
The third feature involves the band aspect.  The band idea is a lesson drawn from
flexible rate experiments.  The lesson comes in two ways.  First, that fully flexible rates
may not be stable rates, and more so, that the more fundamentals (like monetary policy)
are not fully exogenous.  Second, market determined rates might play a useful role in
signaling the need for realignments of the central parity.  Between the market signaling
and policy makers learning and reacting, there may be the potential for gradualist change
in the central parity.  That offers more flexibility than a fixed rate and more stability than
a fully flexible rate.  It thus tries to blend the best of both worlds.16
There are two critical questions in the design of the target zone scheme.  One is
the issue of the band width.  There is no scientific basis to determine a good band width.
Williamson (1996) recommends a 7-10 percent range on either side.  His basis for these
numbers is that less is too little and more is too much.  Ultimately, band width has to be
calibrated on the stability of the central parity real exchange rate and on the stability of
the domestic financial policies.  The more stable each of these is, the more stable the
expected exchange rate and, hence, the narrower the plausible range of fluctuations and
the defensible range.  By contrast, if the equilibrium real rate is subject to substantial
fluctuation. Wide margins are essential. and even that may not be enough.  Clearly, in the
latter case, there is an urgent need to bring financial policies under control since that, not
intervention, is the only way to stabilize the foreign exchange market.  An unstable
equilibrium real exchange rate in turn calls for an extra arrangement that makes the real
central parity significantly flexible over time.  Here is, in fact, a key challenge for
regimes that feature the nominal exchange rate as an explicit policy objective.
A key ingredient in getting good performance is a realistic assessment of the
equilibrium real exchange rate.  This is all the more important, the more significant is
structural change in the trade and capital markets.  The prevalent model for calculation of
real equilibrium exchange rates takes as given a current account target:
(1)          x =  f(R, Y,Y*,. . . )  or   R’= l(x’,. . . . . )
where R is the real exchange rate, Y and Y* are home and foreign output, x is the current
account, and x’ the target level.  The dots represent other relevant policy variables.  For
given paths of output and policy variables that have a bearing on the current account, and
for a given current account target, we arrive at the equilibrium real exchange rate, R’.
The brief discussion makes clear two points: first, there needs to be a current account
target to know what an equilibrium exchange rate is.  Without a target concept, anything
is possible -- 5 percent of GDP deficits or even 10.  As the example of Mexico reminds
us, what seems plausible one day -- and is easily rationalized as the wonders of reform
and modernization -- the next day is called unsustainable.
2
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There are no hard and fast rules for allowable or sustainable deficits. The more a
deficit reflects investment rather than consumption the more plausible the case for
allowing it to go forward. The more a deficit is financed by direct investment, the more
plausible a larger number. But when everything is said and done, large deficits create
vulnerability and that is why a target may be appropriate.
The second point, which is just as important, is that the current account does not
depend exclusively on the real exchange rate.  Other policies need to be consistent to take
weight of the real exchange rate.  Thus, we cannot have full employment, a large fiscal
expansion, and a small deficit without expecting high real interest rates and a major real
appreciation.  They might create the right size current account, but they are not
sustainable because the real interest rate will attract capital and the real appreciation will
harm the traded goods sector.  Since these outcomes are inconsistent with medium term
stability, any target zone arrangement built around them is bound to be challenged.  In
that sense, BBC-style exchange rate arrangements -- or any exchange rate arrangement
for that purpose -- are not a panacea to deal with bad policy.
Williamson (2000), perhaps the most ardent advocate of intermediate regimes,
claims that a well-managed BBC regime could have forestalled the Thai crisis in 1997,
although such a regime could not have saved other countries from contagion of the Thai
meltdown.  Why is the BBC regime unable to ward off the contagion effects?  The band
element of the BBC makes it potentially crisis prone, that is, the obligation to intervene at
the edge of a conventional band can trigger a crisis.  For this reason, Williamson (2000)
argues that emerging market economies in East Asian may consider moving to an
intermediate regime with no obligation to intervene at the edge of the band.
These new intermediate regimes include: the reference rate proposal in which the
authorities do not have to defend a parity but are not allowed to push their currencies
away from the parity.  A soft margin arrangement in which the nominal rate is maintained
within a band around a moving average of current and past market exchange rates.  And
finally, monitoring bands that require hands-off policy within a pre-announced band but
allow intervention without obligation to intervene once the rate goes out of the band.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Valdes that large real appreciations have little chance of going away without a crash.  One surmises the
same fate befalls their mirror image, large deficits.  As the bankers say, it is not speed that kills, it is the
sudden halt.18
The modified versions of an intermediate exchange rate regime may reduce the
vulnerability of emerging market economies to speculative attacks. Nevertheless, they are
subject to the fundamental objection that they require a judgement concerning the
equilibrium real exchange rate.  We do not believe that it will be possible to identify an
equilibrium exchange rate and in the absence of such knowledge such regimes in practice
will evolve to traditional looking fixed exchange rate regimes.
V. The Currency Board Arrangement
V - 1. Overview
The past 20 years have brought a fundamental transformation to monetary
management.  Independent central banks with transparency and some inflation target,
more or less explicit, are now standard.  In many emerging economies we also now
observe independence of central banks and, where rates are flexible, some variant of an
inflation-targeting policy approach.
At the same time, monetary integration is a live theme.  In Europe this has
become a fact with the creation of the European monetary Union and that experience is
growing with the increasing incorporation of countries in the East, a handful as early as
2004 and quite a few on the waiting list beyond.  Indeed, membership in the European
Union comes automatically with membership in  the monetary union and some form of
representation at the European Central Bank.  But even though membership in the
European Union is clearly on the horizon, the larger candidate countries so far remain
attached to discretionary exchange rate regimes, forsaking the readily available option and
benefits of unilaterally adopting the Euro.
In Asia, the discussion of monetary arrangements is picking up at the behest of
Japan.  Noting the European developments and some discussion of dollarization in  Latin
America, and the fragmentation of the region in response to the Asian crisis, Japan is
exploring what kind of monetary arrangements might make sense (See Ogawa and Ito,
2000). As a concept, this goes far beyond the discussion of an Asian IMF or the
establishment of central bank swap lines that are already in place.19
V - 2. Traditional Challenges
Six arguments make up the case against currency board arrangements.  They are,
respectively, sovereignty, the loss of seigniorage, the loss of monetary policy, the loss of
lender of last resort, the loss of fiscal preparedness, and abandonment of the exchange rate.
On the surface, each argument is persuasive; on closer scrutiny none really is.
Sovereignty is beyond discussion; when it comes to the quality of money the argument
does not come up; when it comes to national pride it should not come up in most countries.
The loss of seigniorage is, of course, a critical issue for public finance.  The
inability to pursue an optimal inflation strategy to extract maximum revenue (as a function
of the inflation sensitivity of money demand and the growth rate) limits public sector
revenue and forces either spending cuts or recourse to possibly more distortionary forms
of taxation.  This argument is more appropriate for full dollarization, but even in the case
of a currency board it does apply with the only mitigation that interest is earned on foreign
exchange reserves.  This limits the seigniorage issue to the spread between a country’s
borrowing and lending rates times reserves -- we can imagine reserves being borrowed to
support the currency on a long term basis but invested short term.  The spread is a reality
and the seigniorage issue accordingly is real.  But there is an important offset to the loss of
seigniorage from the reduction in public debt service costs that result from reduced
interest rate -- more on this below -- and this factor is surely far more significant than the
1 percent or so of GDP in seigniorage loss.  Of course, any kind of stability-oriented
monetary policy will yield some bonus but currency boards and dollarization presumably
command the highest bonus.
The loss of monetary policy is, on the surface, very obvious: if money creation is
tightly and mechanically linked to reserve flows, the external balance not the local central
bank determine interest rates.  But there is surely an illusion here: what central bank in say
Latin America can cut interest rates below New York or what central bank in Eastern
Europe can go below Frankfurt.  Their fondest hope is to get down to these levels and the
safest way to get there is to foreswear all and any kind of independence.  In principle there
might be some scope for deeply undervalued currencies, expected to appreciate, to achieve
lower nominal interest rates than New York but achieving such levels of undervaluation is20
unseen in the region except in the immediate aftermath of a  collapse at which time
inflation fears typically abound.
The loss of the lender of last rest resort function is intriguing.  It is based on the
assumption that the central bank, not the Treasury or the world capital market, is the
appropriate lender.  There is surely nothing encouraging about the scene of money
printing to save banks that are facing an external drain -- the brief Turkish experience of
December 2000 with this strategy stark reminds us that this is an express train to currency
collapse.  In that situation, the central bank poured money into failing banks even as that
money poured out of the country cutting central bank reserves at the pace of a billion a
day and more.  At most then the lender of last resort issue has to do with substituting good
credit (not money) for bad credit.  That is intrinsically Treasury function or, if the treasury
can not be a source of good credit, the good part of the banking system if any or the rest of
the world.  It may be the case that there is not good credit available and that as a result
bank closure is inevitable; much better to recognize this than to conceal the fact in a
process of money creation that blows up the currency and the good banks, too.  Lender of
last resort, more often than not, is failed or failing banking policy.
A surprising argument in questioning currency boards is fiscal preparedness.  Of
course, at an elementary level there is a point here: the central bank must be cut off from
the treasury, all back doors must be closed.  It is hard to see how a discretionary monetary
and exchange rate policy can accommodate a lack of good fiscal situation better than a
fixed rate.  At the most extreme level this may just be an argument about the government
being unable to do without seigniorage revenue.  As argued above, the savings on debt
service from lower interest rates under a currency board amply compensate and take away
much of the sting of this argument.  But if it is not that, there is no argument.  To believe
that inflation and devaluation are constructive solutions to a fiscal problem is contradicted
by much of financial history.  Indeed, from a political economy point of view one might
argue that the favorable political and growth effects following upon a shift to a currency
board might offer a quite unique opportunity to implement an important fiscal reform.
The most serious and contentious point about a currency board is the
abandonment of the exchange rate.  This objection comes in two ways.  First, in response
to an unfavorable disturbance, a flexible exchange rate offers an easier way of adjusting21
relative price levels and hence competitiveness than general deflation.  Second, a fixed
rate sets up a one-way option that is bound to be a target for speculative attacks.
Consider first the loss of easy relative price flexibility.  This argument can be
overdone in a number of ways.  First and importantly, most disturbances are temporary
rather than permanent.  As a result they should for the most part be financed rather than
adjusted to.  But before we even get to that discussion, there is, of course, the question of
whether exchange rates are, in fact, a short-run stabilization tool.  With low short-run
elasticities it is entirely possible that rate movements could destabilize the current account
and employment.  That view is more relevant the more the discussion focuses on
temporary disturbances as the target of rate movements.
But the more substantial issue is to view the response to disturbances in a context
of intertemporal optimization including an explicit role for capital markets.  In a world
where there are international capital markets, cyclical disturbances at home or abroad or
temporary terms of trade fluctuations do not require  offsetting movements in relative
prices so as to maintain current accounts balanced.  On the contrary, from a perspective of
intertemporal optimization, partial adjustment of consumption or investment and current
account financing should be most of the buffer.  But if current account adjustment is not
part of the script, here is the need for relative price adjustment?  Of course, this overstates
the point because there will typically be some adjustment of consumption or investment
and, as a result, some need for relative price changes to deal with full employment.  To
some extent this need is met by flexibility of wages and prices but that flexibility may be
incomplete, more so in a new regime.  That leaves a bit of an exchange rate issue but it
also pouts it in a cost benefit perspective.  In terms of the models used in new classical
economics, the  exchange rate can be used as a  “fooling device” to create unexpected
changes in real factor rewards but these will last only as long as expectations and wags-
prices can not adjust.
At the same time, the option to fool agents comes at a cost in the capital market.
If recourse to unexpected movements of the exchange rate are part of the regime they will
translate into a premium in interest rates and hence the cost of capital.  That in turn
translates into a loss of competitiveness which must be made up by lower equilibrium real
wages  (This discussion assumes that capital is mobile and labor is not).  The point of the22
discussion is to say that the devaluation option has limited scope in labor markets, as new
classical economics warns, and it surely has a cost in the capital market.  Closing the
circle suggests that a regime with the devaluation option  translate into lower average
equilibrium real wages compared to a hard peg.
For the case of permanent or highly persistent disturbances the role of exchange
rates becomes, of course, more prominent.  Here it is an issue of adjustment rather than
financing.  This adjustment of the relative prices would, of course, seem to be favored by
exchange rate movements.  But it is also true that price-wage adjustment can do much the
same.  If they can not, because of “rigidities”, it stands to reason that the exchange rate
will rarely do the job without some complication.  That certainly has been the experience
of Latin America where inflation-devaluation cycles have been the centerpiece of the
monetary regime.
3  If anything, exchange  rate has been the dominant  instrument of
destabilization.
It takes a very special kind of money illusion that accepts real wage cuts from a
large and perfectly obvious devaluation but can not generate a fall in wages or prices.
Perhaps it says more about the monetary authorities’ unwilling to create the conditions for
deflation but their willingness and ability to get by with real wage cutting by depreciation
and inflation.  After all, the wage-price regime is not written in stone but rather is mostly
written by the central bank’s systematic policy conduct.
V - 3.  The Gains from Currency Unions and Boards
The gains from a currency board or dollarization come in the financial area and
derive from a far enhanced credibility in the  exchange rate and hence inflation
performance.  The gains come in two forms.  First and most obviously, there is a dramatic
decline in interest rates with all attendant benefits.  That gain is, of course, more important
the more debilitated a country is financially (See Giavazi and Pagano, 1998, who called it
the gain “from tying one’s hands”).  In the case of Greece or Italy becoming part of the
EMU they were altogether striking and they have been just as much in Argentina.  In
countries that are not outright fragile, the gains are still significant since in a modern
                                                                
3 Martinez, Sanchez and Werner (2000), for example, note that pass-through from the exchange rate to
prices is as high as 65 percent, of which 50 percent occurs within 2 quarters.23
financial setting a cost of capital difference of a percentage point or two are decidedly
relevant.  But the gains from abandoning national money are inversely proportional to its
quality, past, current and prospective.
As important are the transformation of the financial sector and the lengthening of
agents’ horizons.  With low inflation and stable inflation, and a stable currency, economic
horizons lengthen.  The lengthening of horizons, in turn, is conducive to investment and
risk taking which translates into growth and this closes a virtuous circle.  Moreover, once
an economy moves out of crisis or state of siege mode, distortions and inefficiencies
become far more apparent and can become the target of public policy.  There is ample
evidence that inflation hurts growth, and high and unstable inflation does so with a
vengeance.  Hence a monetary regime that delivers and  maintains low  inflation, other
thins equal, will help growth.  While these points are quite obvious -- and were behind the
case for low inflation targets on the part of central banks in advanced economies -- on the
periphery and notably in Latin America they are still to be reaped.  In sum, doing away
with inflation is a step toward pervasive and deep reform.
V - 4.  A Currency Board for Korea?
The preceding discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the currency board
arrangement suggest that the system deserves a careful examination as an alternative
regime in the long-run for the East Asian countries instead of dismissing it outright as an
arrangement politically unacceptable.  The ASEAN plus the three  northeast Asian
countries have been working together to create a regional arrangement for financial
cooperation which may be a first step toward establishing an East Asian currency union.
Although monetary integration in East Asia is far off in the future, the discussion
on regional financial cooperation renders credence to the currency board as a viable
alternative to either the flexible or intermediate regime for East Asia.  However, in  the
short-run or during the transition period, we seriously doubt that Korea should entertain
the idea of adopting a currency board arrangement.
There are two considerations that make a currency board to be an appropriate
regime for Korea at this time.  The fundamental problem is that Korea may need real
exchange rate flexibility to soften the impact of changes in world demand for Korean24
output and exports.  Moreover, we believe that the Korean authorities do not need to give
up real exchange rate flexibility in order to enjoy a credible low interest rate regime.  This
may be a problem for countries with a history of high inflation but this is not the case for
Korea.
VI. Recent Experience in Korea and other Emerging Markets
A number of recent studies have suggested that a nominal exchange rates fixed at
untenable levels were one of the major causes of financial crises in emerging markets.
The IMF view is that the intermediate regimes may serve as temporary systems, but in
the long-run the choice for these countries comes down to either floats or hard pegs.
Nevertheless, many countries in East Asia have apparently  been reluctant to accept the
advice of the IMF and the economic profession in general.  Malaysia decided to adopt a
fixed exchange rate system in the midst of a crisis, China continues to adhere to what
they call a managed floating system, and other East Asian countries intervene extensively
to stabilize their nominal exchange rates.
4
Baig (2000) and Hernandez and Montiel (2001) show that the currencies of the
East Asian crisis countries have been relatively more stable since early in 1999,
compared to a representative sample of other floating currencies.  Their interpretation of
this evidence is that the crisis countries have reverted back to the old regime of pegging
their currencies to the dollar:
  
“Where the authorities of a country do not announce any objectives that would
permit a judgment that they had succeeded or failed, but where they nevertheless
have views about where the exchange rate ought to be, and are prepared to act on
those views.  They announce no parity or band, but they typically worry if the rate
depreciates a lot, and they intervene, or change interest rates, or sometimes seek
to influence the flow of capital, with a view to having an impact on the exchange
rate.  And they may certainly worry about the exchange rate appreciating so much
as to threaten their country’s competitiveness, as has been the case in Korea”
(Williamson, 2000).
                                                                
4 See Park, Chung, and Wang (1999) for the evidence of intervention in Korea.25
As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1, the volatility of the nominal
exchange rates  of the East Asian countries  has increased a great deal since 1998,
compared to the pre-crisis period (see also appendix I)  Nevertheless, the currencies of
these countries have been less volatile since January 1999 than the Yen and other floating
currencies outside of East Asia (see Table 2A and B).  Baig (2000) also shows that while
the volatility of exchange rates has increased, that of the interest rates and reserves has
decreased in the crisis countries.  It is not clear how these two different developments
should be interpreted, but an index of exchange rate flexibility  (the ratio of standard
deviation of exchange rate changes (SDEX) divided by SDEX + standard deviation of the
ratio of changes in reserves over lagged monetary base) suggests that Korea and
Singapore have returned to the pre-crisis degree of inflexibility.
We have attempted to identify some of the developments that may have caused
the increase in instability in the foreign exchange market.  One explanation for the
increase may be related to the shift from managed to free floating, itself, and a simple
statistical test bears out the significance of the regime shift.  As shown in appendix I, a
regime dummy in a conditional variance equation is shown to be statistically significant
and its estimated coefficient is positive (see Table 3).
In addition to the regime shift, deregulation of capital account transactions
appears to have contributed to the increased volatility of the won-dollar exchange rate.
Capital market opening has increased both the volume and volatility of capital
movements in and out of Korea’s financial markets.  As shown in Table 4, the ratio of the
standard deviation of capital flows in the post-crisis period to that of the pre-crisis period
is 8.6, suggesting that volatility of capital flows rose markedly since deregulation took
effect in 1998
Capital account liberalization has also increased integration of Korea’s capital
markets into the markets of major international financial centers including New York.  As
a result of the increased pace of integration, external shocks originating in New York and
Tokyo are almost instantaneously transmitted to Korea’s financial markets, in particular
the equity market.    Reflecting the growing trend of integration, for example, the26
coefficient of correlation between the U.S. and Korean shock prices rose to 0.57 after the
crisis from-0.86 during the pre-crisis period (see Table 5).
Finally, a number of recent studies provide some evidence that foreign portfolio
investors operating out of the equity market in Korea have exhibited a tendency to engage
in positive feedback trading: buying when the market is booming and selling when it is
slumping.  These studies also suggest that foreign investors are prone to moving together
in a herd in East Asian financial markets (Cho, Kho, and Stulz, 1998, Kim and Wei, 1999,
Park and Park, 1999).  The positive feedback trading and herd behavior of foreign
portfolio investors who hold as a group more than 30 percent of the total valuation of the
equity market in Korea  are likely to have, in part,  been responsible for increasing
instability of the stock market, which appears to have spilt over into the foreign exchange
market, amplifying volatility of the nominal exchange rate.
VI - 1. Intervention and Policy Objectives
A number of recent studies on exchange rate policies have shown that policymakers
in developing and emerging market economies have been reluctant to let their exchange
rates fluctuate freely for fear of a large depreciation.  One of the policymakers’ fears with
floating is the devastating effect of the currency as well as maturity mismatch on the
balance sheets of banks and corporations laden with a large amount of U.S. dollar-
denominated short-term debts (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000a and b, and Eichengreen and
Hausmann, 1999, Goldfajn and Olivares, 2000, and Mussa et al., 2000).
The central banks of developing countries do not readily allow a sudden and
steep depreciation of their currencies, leading their exchange rates to be quite stable.  The
more serious these balance sheet effects  are, the larger is the  amount of currency
mismatches between dollar-denominated assets and liabilities.  According to Calvo and
Reinhart (2000a) and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), the possibility that  the
emerging economies face negative balance sheet effects at the time of a large
depreciation is high since their banks and corporations usually do not have proper tools to
hedge their exchange risks although they have large amount of dollar liabilities.  Calvo
(2000), Mussa et al. (2000) and Goldfajn and Olivares (2000) also point out that the low27
volatility of the exchange rates may encourage more currency mismatches by
discouraging hedging attempts.
Another possibility is that a large depreciation may complicate inflation
management while it could downgrade their sovereign  ratings and consequently reduce
their accessibility to international financial markets (Goldfajn and Werlang, 2000, Calvo
and Reinhart, 2000b and Hausman et al, 1999).
Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) find  that t he sovereign ratings of  developing
countries were significantly downgraded following the currency crises, and that the
magnitude of their downgrade was far greater than that of developed countries.  They
thus argue that this credibility problem has been pervasive in developing countries.  Since
the loss of access to international lending may cause disruptive effects on the developing
economies that heavily depend on foreign capital for investment, the central banks
minimize the  volatility of  the exchange rates by intervention in the foreign exchange
markets or adjustments in the monetary policies.
The central banks of developing  countries that are reluctant to allow higher
volatility of exchange rates are concerned about the effects of depreciation on domestic
prices.  In particular, the central banks of the economies with higher degree of exchange
rate pass-through try to minimize the inflationary effects of depreciation by controlling
the downward pressure of local currencies.  According to the  empirical findings  of
Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000b), the degree of pass-
through is higher in developing countries than in developed countries.  Thus, the fear of
floating due to the fear of inflation would be more common in the developing economies.
In addition, the central banks would be more concerned about the pass-through and then
the volatility of exchange rates if they pursue inflation targets or the economy has a de
facto wage indexation. (Goldfajn and Olivares, 2000 and Hausmann et al., 1999)
These arguments may be able to account for only a part of the reality.  The first
three (the balance sheet effect, credibility problem and fear of inflation) are valid only
when the value of the local currency depreciates.  They are, however, not valid when the
exchange rate tends to appreciate and at the same time, show low volatility.  Although an
appreciation of the local currency improves balance sheets and credibility as well as
lowers inflationary pressures, the central banks are likely to intervene to restrain further28
appreciation in order not to lose export competitiveness.  Thus, it would be more
appropriate to argue that the first three factors are the reasons for the fear of large
depreciation or devaluation rather than the fear of floating.
A prima facie evidence of market intervention is, of course, the massive
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by buying current account surpluses.  The
level of reserves increased to 21 percent of GDP and was more than twice as large as the
volume of short-term foreign debt (see Tables 6 and 7).  Between 1998 and 2000, the
current account recorded large surpluses ranging from 12.6 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP
each year (see Table 7).
Had the authorities abstained from market intervention, the nominal exchange
rate might have appreciated much more than otherwise, possibly choking off the ongoing
recovery from the crisis.  Therefore, a market intervention designed to mop up current
account surpluses could account for the authorities’ intervention and the reserve gain.  
Have the authorities also  intervened when they thought the  country’s export
competitiveness was being eroded or price stability was threatened?  The  evidence
suggests that they have.  Measures of market intervention developed by Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1998) and Glick and Whiborg (1997) suggest that policymakers in Thailand
and Indonesia have intervened less forcefully.  For Korea indices of market intervention
hardly changed between the two different exchange rate regimes (Table 2).  However, it
is normally expected that the regime shift would result in a substantial decrease in these
indicators, and this development is not found in East Asia.
5
Using high frequency data it has also been shown that the Korean authorities
have been active in managing the won-dollar exchange rates (Park, Chang, and Wang,
1999).  Using the intra-day data over the 10 days from September 10 to 20 in 1999, the
authors show that the large change in the nominal exchange rate disappeared within a few
minutes.  Unlike other free-floating regimes, the intra-day exchange rate movements did
not show any volatility clustering, suggesting that the Korean authorities were actively
managing the nominal exchange rate.
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average less than 0.3 during the 1980’s.29
The evidence discussed above suggests that, like many other emerging market
economies, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia have adopted an intermediate exchange rate
regime. What have been the objectives of market intervention in these countries?  The
analysis of intra-day data suggests that market intervention has been geared to stabilize
high-frequency exchange rate movements in Korea.  But there may  have been other
motives behind management of the local currency-dollar bilateral exchange rates in the
three countries.
Smoothing operations for high frequency exchange movements may be necessary
after a crisis, to stabilize market expectations. Under such a circumstance, the authorities’
smoothing operations could help market participants establish their expectations on the
future movements of both the real and nominal exchange rates by minimizing the effect
of noise trading (Hernandez and Montiel, 2001).
If stabilizing the nominal exchange rate is the main objective, then Hernandez
and Montiel (2001) argue that the exchange rate smoothing would lead to  substantial
fluctuations in the stock of foreign reserves around a certain level that is deemed
appropriate for intervention and achieving other objectives.  However, they do not find
any evidence that Korea and other East Asian crisis-hit countries have used their reserves
to conduct smoothing operations; instead, the stocks of reserves have exhibited a
systematic tendency to increase over time in these countries.
Surprisingly, the volatility of foreign exchange reserves has declined
substantially during the post-crisis period in Korea.  The Korean authorities, it appears,
have not resorted  to the use of reserves to moderate the movements of the nominal
exchange rate.  Instead, they have relied on a few state-owned banks to intervene in the
market, using their own holdings of foreign exchange, which are not counted as part of
the central bank foreign reserves.  Our proposal for a reserve target would clearly require
that such operations be included in the authorities’ net foreign assets.  If their
interventions were not effective, the authorities made it known that they would step in
through  sterilized intervention to reduce instability in the foreign exchange market.
When the yen depreciation recently led to a parallel depreciation of the Korean won, the
central bank was able to clamp down the market by simply announcing their intention of
conducting sterilized intervention.30
The three crisis countries may not have been as concerned about stabilizing their
dollar exchange rates as much as they  about stabilizing either the nominal or real
effective exchange rate.  These countries may have had good reasons to peg their
exchange rates to or to manage them against a basket of the currencies of the countries
with which they have established extensive trade relations.  Hernandez and Montiel
speculate that the East Asian countries may have preferred a basket pegging to fixing to
the U.S.dollar because the importance of the U.S. as their trading partner has declined
and they may want to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.
However, Hernandez and Montiel do not find any evidence that any of the East
Asian countries which they analyze were managing their bilateral exchange rates vis-à-
vis the U.S. dollar to stabilize a nominal effective exchange rate.  They do not identify
the currencies included in their basket, but assuming that the basket contains the U.S.
dollar, Yen, and the Euro, the authorities would manage the won-dollar exchange rate to
offset fluctuations in the U.S. dollar-yen or the U.S. dollar-Euro bilateral exchange rates.
When the Yen depreciates, for example,  vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar as it has in recent
periods, one would expect an intervention to engineer a depreciation of the won-dollar
exchange rate so that the nominal effective exchange would remain relatively stable.
Since Korea and other crisis-hit countries in East Asia have followed export-led
development strategies and are likely to continue to rely on exports for growth, one might
conjecture that Korean policymakers have intervened in the foreign exchange market to
stabilize a real effective exchange rate.  Once again, Hernandez and Montiel do not find
any evidence that may support the conjecture.  If the Korean authorities were as sensitive
to maintaining export competitiveness as they are often claimed to be, then one might
conjecture that they would intervene more actively when the exchange rate appreciates
than where it depreciates.  To examine this possibility, we have estimated conditional
probability that the authorities are more likely to step in to reverse the exchange rate
movement, when it appreciates than otherwise.  Our estimation results do not provide any
evidence to support such an asymmetric pattern of intervention.
In summary, what were the Korean policymakers trying to achieve in
intervening in the foreign exchange market?  The empirical evidence provided by Park,
Chung, and Wang,(1999) and Hernandez and Montiel(2001) suggests that their objectives31
have been:  i) to stabilize day to day volatility in the won-dollar exchange;  ii) to resist
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate after the crisis ; and  iii) to build a reserve
buffer to financial vulnerabilities the economy may have to face while undergoing
financial and corporate restructuring.
Although Hernandez and Montiel  de-emphasize the significance of the first
objective, in a country like Korea where hedging facilities are limited to many firms in
the trade sector and expensive, the authorities have been under constant pressure to
moderate fluctuations in the won-dollar exchange rate (Park, Chung, and Wang, 1999).
Finally, one advantage of the flexible exchange rate system is that it allows the
monetary authorities a measure of independence in conducting monetary policy to attain
domestic policy objectives of low inflation with a high level of employment -- which may
in turn help stabilize indirectly the nominal exchange rate.  As shown in appendix II,
there is little evidence  that Korea and other East Asian countries have gained any
noticeable monetary autonomy.  It is not clear, however, whether this lack of
independence is the result of market intervention or other developments.
Our interpretation recent experience is that for Korea our proposed regime would
be a natural extension of policies that have developed since the crisis.  The authorities
have intervened in the foreign exchange market but have allowed substantial changes in
rates over time.  What is needed now is to move forward with a regime that clarifies the
objectives and procedures consistent with a managed floating environment.
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a framework for monetary and
exchange rate policy appropriate for Korea.  Our main conclusion is that Korea should
stay with the managed float it introduced in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, but should
add inflation targeting and should make the criterion for sterilized intervention explicit.
Sterilized intervention should be assigned the task of limiting day to day volatility
in the value of the won against a well-defined basket of major foreign currencies.32
Intervention designed to limit volatility will generate deviations in the government's net
reserves from their target level.  In this event the intervention rule will become
asymmetric so as to move toward the target level for net reserves.
We recommend that changes in the monetary base be assigned the task of hitting a
short-term interest rate derived from a Taylor rule.  We do not think that the Korean
authorities will have difficulties in establishing a credible regime along these lines.
The key assumption behind our proposal is that international capital flows will be
consistent with current account balances and the evolution of net debt for Korea that are
acceptable to the authorities.  This, in our view, will require very active prudential
regulation of domestic financial markets in addition to a stable macro policy environment.
While there are good arguments both for intermediate regimes and hard pegs we
do not believe that these regimes are consistent with Korea's current circumstances.  In
the absence of explicit rules for floating and inflation targeting it seems to us likely that
that policy will drift toward a return to an adjustable peg regime prone to crises.33
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Appendix I. An Open Economy Model
I-1  Some examples of policy reactions under inflation targeting
1.
Suppose a domestic boom increases imports and the current account deficit.  If this were
not financed by an increase in private capital inflows at the initial interest rate, the
nominal exchange rate would tend to depreciate.  Our regime would automatically lean
against the exchange rate depreciation for three reasons.
First, the fall in the output gap rule would require a rise in the target interest rate.
Second, the exchange rate depreciation would increase actual and expected inflation and
the target interest rate would rise.
Third if the exchange rate depreciates rapidly the central bank will be a net buyer of
domestic currency.  Sterilization would increase domestic credit and reduce international
reserves.
It follows that some of the current account deficit would be financed by a decline in
reserves.  If the exchange rate depreciates slowly and markets remain orderly intervention
would not be called for.
2.
The effects of a decline in domestic activity would be symmetric.  A domestic recession
would generate a current account surplus, a stronger currency, lower domestic interest
rates and a fall in reserves.
Over the course of a business cycle international reserves would return to their target
level.37
3.
Suppose world demand for Korean goods declines because of a fundamental demand
shift away from Koreas goods or a decline in activity in the rest of the world. This is
sometimes called a change in the terms of trade.  If the current account deficit were not
offset by an increased capital inflow the exchange rate would tend to depreciate.
In this case an increase in the output gap would tend to lower the domestic target interest
rate.
The expected inflation effect would tend to fall with output but rise with the depreciation
of the exchange rate.  The net effect from the inflation target rule is uncertain.
Intervention would tend to lean against the exchange rate depreciation.  The decline in
international reserves would finance some of the current account deficit.
4.
A shift toward Korean exports would have symmetric effects.  The current account
surplus would be associated with exchange rate appreciation and higher domestic interest
rates.  The surplus would be in part financed by an increase in reserves.
Reserves would return to their target level if the change in the demand for exports was
caused by the business cycle abroad but would not return if there was a permanent shift in
the relative demand for Korean goods.
A permanent demand shift would generate a permanent deviation from the reserve target
and would have to be reversed by asymmetric intervention.  Even though intervention is
reversed it may not be a mistake since slowing the adjustment in the exchange rate may
permit a less costly adjustment to the permanent change in the demand for exports.
  
5.38
Suppose with no cyclical or relative demand shocks that private capital inflows increase
because investment in Korea becomes relatively attractive.  This is sometimes called the
capital inflow problem.  This puts upward pressure on the exchange rate and, in turn,
generates a current account deficit.  The appreciation of the exchange rate limits the
capital inflow since it reduces expected profitability.
The domestic output gap will fall and this will tend to raise the target domestic interest
rate, reducing domestic expenditure and making room for the current account deficit, but
encouraging the capital inflow.
The expected inflation rate would fall and this would require a decline in the domestic
interest rate.
Intervention would tend to resist the appreciation and international reserves would rise. In
this case the current account is more than matched by a private capital inflow.  The
international reserves increase is financing a capital inflow rather than a current account
deficit. In this case the build up of international reserves would not be automatically
reversed and would have to be reversed by asymmetric intervention Again the
intervention may not be a mistake since it spreads the real effects of the capital inflow
over time.
The important question is whether or not the investment is productive and prudent.  That
is, the current account deficit is the real transfer that allows an increase in the capital
stock and the efficient utilization of foreign savings. If distorted incentives or irrational
exuberance generates the capital inflow it would of course be better to completely
insulate the economy.  The problem is that in deciding to open the capital account the
government has given up the only effective way to do this.  Exchange market
intervention to defend temporary exchange rate pegs are themselves serious distortions
for private capital flows. Distortions to domestic credit markets are magnified by capital
flows.  But capital flows are magnified by sterilized intervention.39
6.
If private investment in Korea becomes less attractive the effects are symmetric to those
described in 5.  Exchange rate depreciation is associated with a current account surplus.
The effects on the domestic interest rate target are uncertain and the depreciation is
associated with a decline in reserves.
The fall in reserves is permanent and would have to be reversed by asymmetric
intervention
While all the situations outlined above involve changes in current accounts but there is no
sensible way to target the current account itself.  In practice, we do not observe the
shocks that jointly determine the current account, the exchange rate, domestic output and
inflation.  The best we can do is put in place a policy regime that sets out a predictable
government reaction to changes in market conditions.




The very general points made in Appendix 1 can be made more precise with a
model of  a small open economy with inflation targeting developed by Svensson (1997
and 2000).  We extend this model by  including explicitly the current account that
depends upon income, the real exchange rate, and foreign income.  This model will then
be used to evaluate viability of a macroeconomic policy regime that  espouses free
floating, free capital mobility and inflation targeting.
The model consists of a Philips curve, an aggregate demand equation, a policy
objective function in the form of the Taylor rule, an interest rate parity condition, and a
specification of the current account.  We  also follow Svensson in specifying
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determination of the foreign variables in the model.  There is an equation describing
government expenditure policy (equation 5).  Following Fischer (2001), it is assumed that
fiscal policy is activated to remove any large imbalances in the current account.
I.  Model
1. Aggregate supply (Philips curve)
t t
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where  pt is the log domestic price level
yt is the log level of output.
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t  is a zero-mean productivity shock
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where
st is the nominal exchange rate, and  pt
* the log foreign price level.
The disturbance term,  t e  obeys
1 1 ˆ+ + + = t t t e e g e e   -------------------------------------------------------(3)
where  1 0 < < e g  and  t e ˆ is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variances 
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2.  Aggregate demand (IS Curve)
* *
1/ 1/ 1/ ˆ ()
d nn
tttttyty ttt ttttt yygCAq yyy i faa h p + + + -=---+++++  -----------------(4)
In equation (6), it  is the nominal rate interest, which is the instrument of monetary policy,
yt
* the log foreign output level, and  t g  the government expenditure.  The disturbance
term h
d
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t h ˆ  is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variances 
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3.  Taylor Rule
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4.  Interest parity condition in real terms
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where jt  is a foreign exchange risk premium.
5.  Current Account
*
*
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6.  Government Expenditure Policy
11 ˆ tgtgtt ggcCAg g ++ =++   -------------------------------------------------(9)
7.  Determination of Foreign Variables42
Following Svensson (2000), foreign variables and jt  are assumed to be explained by AR
processes:
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Then the simultaneous equation system (equation (1) through (14)) for the open economy
can be represented as follows:
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and   1 J  and  2 J  are appropriately defined parameter matrices.  In the error vector,  t e ,
three terms,  1t w ,  2t w  and  3t w  are added to reflect expectation errors:
1111 (/) ttt Etw pp +++ =+
1121 (/) ttt Eytyw +++ =+
1121 ˆ (/) ttt Eqtqw +++ =+
Since there are five endogenously determined variables ( ˆ ,,,, ttttt yqiCA p
) and




), for the system
to generate a unique stable equilibrium, the number of eigenvalues lying inside the unit
circle  should be equal to the number of endogenous variables (5)
7.






- =L ,  L is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, and  Q contains the
eigenvectors of  1 J .  The purpose of diagonalization is that it allows us to write the
matrix system as a set of first-order equations of a scalar from for 
1
tt zQy
- = .  Then
five variables of  t z  are solved by forward iterations and the other nine variables of  t z
are solved by backward iterations.  After finding solutions for  t z , the original variables
t y  are restored by multiply Q to  t z .
II.  Results of Optimal Policy
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In order to describe the dynamics and to obtain solutions of the model, we have
assumed values of the parameters with model that are a prior reasonable (see Table ).
Diagrams I through IV show changes in the endogenous variables over time to exogenous
shocks with different specification of the Taylor rule and with or without activation of
fiscal policy.  We have examined the following four types of shocks with  different
reaction functions:
(i) a change in i
*
;
(ii) a change in  y
n
;
(iii) a cost push shock; and
(iv) a demand shock
The reaction functions are :
(i) i=1.5p and  (ii) I=1.5p+0.5( y- y
n
):
The government expenditure policy function is also activated where the current account
deficit rises above 2 percent of  y in this impulse response exercises.
In all cases of our exercises, the model is stable and converges to new equilibria.
However, this conclusion follows only for a set of parameter values we have selected.  As
we discuss in the text, it is possible that the model may display multiple equilibria and
instability for different sets of parameters.
Table 1. Parameter Values
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Figure I.  Demand Shock
             i=1.5p        g=exogenous46
Figure II.  Exchange Shock
             i=1.5p        g=exogenous47
Figure III.  y
n Shock
             i=1.5p +0￿ (y-y n)       g=exogenous48
Figure IV.  Cost Push Shock
             i=1.5p        g=exogenous
Appendix II. Volatility of the Nominal Exchange Rate (with Chi-Young Song
*)
In this section, we examine whether volatility of the exchange rate has increased
in the East Asian countries since the adoption of a free floating regime, and to what
extent it has.  For this purpose, we have estimated GARCH (generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity) variances of the daily changes in the exchange rates of
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.  Our empirical examination follows a GARCH (1,1)
model that consists of the following two equations:
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where  t s  is log of the exchange rate of a local currency per U.S. dollar, and  D is a first
difference operator.  t u  is an error term of the mean equation and  t h  is a conditional
variance of  t u .  t W  represents a set of information available at time t and  t e  is an error
term of the variance equation.  We have estimated equations (1) and (2) for the three East
Asian countries which shifted to free floating in 1997 from a managed floating system (a
fixed regime in the case of Thailand) and then compare the values of the  conditional
variances across the different regimes.
Our sample period for the managed floating or fixed regime runs from May 1,
1995 to April 30, 1997, while the sample period for the free floating regime is two years
from November 1, 1998 to October 31, 2000.  We exclude the first few months of the
1997 crisis from our sample even though the exchanges rates were allowed to freely float
in all three countries during this period, because the inclusion of the earlier period of
crisis in the free floating regime could  overstate the exchange rate volatility and then
skew the results.  The order of dependent lags in equation (1) follows the Schwarz
information criterion.
The results of our estimation of equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 1.
They  suggest that the exchange rate volatility under  the free floating system is  much
greater than under the managed floating regime in East Asia.  In particular, the increase
in volatility has been most conspicuous in Indonesia.  According to our estimation, the
volatility of the free floating regime in Indonesia is about 129 times as large as it was
before.  Among the three countries, Indonesia shows the largest increase in volatility of
the exchange rate under the free floating regime.  There has also been a marked increase
in the exchange rate volatility in Thailand.  Our results indicate that it increased by more
than 19 times.  Since the exchange rates in Indonesia and Thailand had been very stable
prior to the East Asian crisis, these results for the two countries are not surprising.  In
contrast, volatility of the nominal exchange in Korea has not increased as much as it has
in the other two countries under the free floating regime, while it was the largest before
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the crisis among the three countries.  However, the volatility of the won–dollar exchange
rate in the free floating system is still more than twice as large as in the managed floating
system.
In order to examine the extent to which the regime shift has caused the increase
in volatility, we have included a regime dummy ( t D ) in equations (1) and (2) which takes
the value of one under the free floating system and zero otherwise.
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The estimation results of the modified GARCH (1,1) model are presented in
Table 2.  They show that the regime dummy variable in the conditional variance equation
is statistically significant and its estimated coefficient is positive for all three countries.
Therefore, the shift to floating appears to have contributed to increased instability in the
foreign exchange market in all three countries.  The impact of the shift was most
conspicuous in Indonesia, to be followed by Thailand and Korea.  Changes in GARCH
variances of the three East Asian countries before and after adopting a  free floating
system are depicted in Figure 2.
In addition to the exchange rate regime change, the higher volatility could in part
be attributed to the increase in volatility of capital flows.  Figure 3 depicts monthly net
capital inflows to Korea and Thailand since 1991 (we do not have similar figures for
Indonesia).   Prior to the financial crisis, both  countries had been a sharp increase in
capital inflows (net).  After the crisis, however, on a net  basis, capital inflows have
displayed a great deal of variability in Korea, whereas a net outflow of capital has
continued in Thailand.  These changes in capital movement must have contributed to the
higher volatility of the exchange rate during the free floating regime.51
Appendix III. Exchange Change Rate Regime and Monetary Independence
The question of whether free floating has increased autonomy in the conduct of
monetary policy will be examined in this section.  Edwards and Savastano (1998)
examined the Mexican case and found that the Bank of Mexico systematically adjusted
its monetary  policy in response to changes in the exchange rate even during the free
floating regime.  In contrast, Borenzstein and Zettelmeyer (2000) examined the effects of
changes in the U.S. interest rate on local interest rates, and found that the magnitude of
the effects is much smaller under the free floating regime than the currency board system,
indicating a higher degree of monetary autonomy with a more flexible exchange rate
regime.  Their analysis includes Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand for the floating system, and Hong Kong and Argentina for the currency
board system.
Extending their approach to the panel data of 47 countries, Golfjan and Olivares
(2000) found a similar result.
III-1. Model
In this section, we empirically examine whether the introduction of a  free
floating system has affected the degree of monetary independence in Indonesia, Korea
and Thailand following an  approach  similar to that of Borenzstein and Zettelmeyer
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where  =
i
t r  the interest rate of country i at time t,  = t f a foreign shock at time t,  = D  a
first difference operator. The foreign shocks examined in this study are  changes in the
U.S. interest rate, the log of the U.S. stock prices, and the log of the yen-dollar exchange
rate.
In our examination, it will be  assumed that the effects of foreign shocks are
transmitted through arbitrage dictated by the uncovered interest parity (UIP).  Even52
though the bond markets are not well developed and incompletely open to foreign
investors in all three countries, the UIP could hold if borrowing from  international
financial markets by domestic residents is permitted.
The UIP condition is:
E E E r r
e f i / ) ( - + =    (6)
where  =
f r  the foreign interest rate (U.S. interest rate),  = E  the exchange rate of
domestic currency against the U.S. dollar,  =
e E expected exchange rate.
As for the effects of foreign shocks on domestic financial variables, the following
developments are expected:
(i) When the U.S. interest rate rises, domestic firms and financial institutions tend to
borrow more from domestic sources than from the international financial markets.
They will also try to substitute domestic currency debts for dollar denominated
borrowings.  Consequently the domestic interest rate rises and the domestic currency
depreciates.
(ii) In response to the rise in the U.S. stock price, the domestic stock price is also
expected to rise, and market participants are likely to speculate that the increase in
the expected returns of domestic stocks will induce more capital inflows.  Thus, 
e E
falls and the dollar denominated borrowing will be less costly.  As a result, the
domestic interest rate falls.
(iii) When the Japanese yen depreciates against the dollar, 
e E  rises since the current
account is expected to deteriorate due to the loss of export competitiveness caused by
the weaker yen, making the dollar denominated borrowing more costly.  As a result,
the domestic interest rate rises.
In a flexible exchange rate system, exchange rates are expected to adjust to the
foreign  shocks more fully and quickly.  Thus, the effects of the shocks on domestic
interest rates are weaker when the exchange rate floats freely than  when rates are either53
fixed or managed.  In the fixed or managed floating regime,  t f D  would be statistically
significant, whereas its significance may disappear in the free floating regime or the
absolute value of its coefficient will be smaller even though it remains significant.  This
result may indicate the existence of a higher degree of monetary autonomy.  If foreign
shocks affect the domestic interest rate, it is expected that  0 > a for the U.S interest rate
and the yen-dollar rate, and  0 < a  for the U.S. stock price.
The sample period for equation (5) for the fixed or managed floating system runs
from May 1, 1995 to April 30, 1997 and for the free floating regime from November 1,
1998 to October 31, 2000.  As before, the earlier period of the 1997 crisis is excluded to
avoid skewness of the results.
In our empirical investigation, we focus only on days of large foreign
shocks instead of using entire daily observations within the sample period.  Sample points
are the 50 largest changes in  t f in the two different exchange rate regimes.  That is, our
sample includes only 50 days of largest absolute changes in  t f .  Accordingly, sample
observations actually used in estimating equation (5) are not in a consecutive order of
time.  Smaller changes in  t f are disregarded on the ground that market participants
would not respond to these changes probably due to a high transactions cost.
The data for the foreign shocks are the U.S. federal fund rate, the Dow Jones
Industrial Index, and the close rate of the NY market for the yen-dollar exchange rate.
For a domestic interest rates of the three East Asian countries, this study uses their call
money market rates.
Table 9 summaries observations of the three foreign shocks.  It can be
seen that the averages of 50 largest shocks are three or four times larger than those of the
entire sample.  The standard deviations of the 50 observations are also no less than those
of the entire samples.  This indicates that the 50 largest observations can be separated out
from the others in the sample period.
Any changes in  t f (foreign shocks) may affect the domestic interest rates
with a lag.  In order to account for the existence of the lag, equation (5) is modified to
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Equation (7) indicates that a foreign shock observed at time t could affect the
domestic interest rate at t+k.  However, a large change in the variable representing the
foreign shock between t+1 and t+k could also lead to changes in the domestic interest rate
at t+k (
i
k t r + D ).  In order to explain this possible lag effect, another variable 
'
j t f + D  is
introduced in equation (7).  This variable captures the effect of a large change in the
foreign shock at time t+j subsequent to the observation of a large foreign shock at time t.
Both foreign shocks at time t and t+j are included in the group of 50 largest shocks.  If
there is no large foreign shock at t + j, then 
'
j t f + D = 0.
Equation (7) can also be used to detect the presence of other contemporaneous
effects of foreign shocks.  For instance, where k = 1 and  1 b in (7) is statistically
significant, then  1 + D t f  captures the contemporaneous effect on the domestic interest of
changes in the foreign shock variable for two consecutive days.  When k = 2,  1 b gauges
one day lagged effect of a change in  t f  for two  consecutive days.  Similarly,  2 b
measures the contemporaneous effect of a large change in  f t  that follows two days later
after an initial foreign shock was observed at time t.  If 
'
j t f + D ’s are statistically
significant in equation (7) whereas  t f D is not in equation (5), this means that domestic
interest rates respond to foreign shocks only when the shocks are sustained.  The
estimation results of equations (5) and (7) are reported in Table 4.  In this study, we have
estimated equation (7) only for k=1 and 2.
In equation (5), the coefficients of  t f D are positive as expected in both Korea
and Thailand when foreign shocks are represented by changes in the U.S. federal fund
rate.  In a floating system, the estimates of  ꗡare smaller than they were during the
managed or fixed exchange rate period, but  t f D is not significant in either country.
None of the independent variables in equation (7) is statistically significant even at the 10
percent level, indicating that the lagged effects of any exogenous external shock on the
domestic interest rate are negligible.(see Table 10A)55
When the foreign shock variable is represented by the U.S. stock price
index(Table 10B), it has no measurable effect on the domestic interest rate in the free
floating regime in all three countries.  However, a large change in the U.S. stock price
produces predictable effect on the domestic interest in the managed floating system in
Korea.  In the case of Thailand where it was under a fixed exchange rate system, the
estimation results show that large changes in  f t that occur every two other days exert
significant negative effects on the domestic interest rate as the model predicts.  Lagged
effects of the U.S. stock price changes on the call rate in Indonesia are also detectable,
but the signs of  1 b and 2 b are shown to be positive against the model’s prediction.
After the three countries moved to a floating regime in late 1997, the results of
estimation of both equations (5) and (7) suggest that changes in the U.S. stock price index
have had little effect on the domestic interest rates of these countries.  None of the
independent variables included in equations (5) and (7) appears to have any explanatory
power.  However, these results should not be taken at their face values, because stock
prices of these countries do move rather quickly in response to changes in the Dow Jones
Industrial Index.  The statistical significance under the free floating regime reported in
Table 4 therefore may reflect the segmentation of capital markets in the countries under
consideration.
Our estimation results do not change substantially when the yen-dollar exchange
rate is used as an external shock variable(Table 10C).  In the case of Korea, estimated
equations (5) and (7) do not provide any evidence as to whether there has been any
increase in monetary autonomy after adopting a floating rate system.  One could detect a
one day lagged effect in Indonesia during the floating regime period, but  1 b in equation
(7) has a wrong sign.  The experience of Thailand is more interesting, however, in that
the lagged effects of changes in the yen-dollar rate are pronounced when the exchange
rate was very much fixed to the dollar, whereas these effects disappeared with the
deregulation of the foreign exchange market.
In summary, it is difficult to determine at this stage the extent to which the effects
of a changes in the U.S. interest rate are transmitted to the domestic financial markets of
the three East Asian countries in either the floating or managed floating system.
Although there is evidence suggesting that the effects of changes in the U.S. stock prices56
on the domestic interest rates in East Asia have weakened since these countries moved to
a flexible exchange rate regime, this result must be interpreted with caution.
Fluctuations in  the yen-dollar exchange rate have had weaker effects on the
interest rate in Thailand since it adopted a free floating system.  However, a similar shift
in the exchange rate regime did not appear to have increased monetary autonomy in
Korea.  In Indonesia, the shift in fact has amplified the effects of changes in  the yen-
dollar exchange rate on the domestic economy.  In view of the preceding discussion,
there is no strong evidence indicating that monetary independence has increased in  the
three East Asian countries since they moved to flexible exchange regimes.
Table 1        GARCH Estimation of Exchange Rate Volatility
Fixed or Managed Floating Free Floating
Variables
Korea Indonesia Thailand Korea Indonesia Thailand
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Note:*,** : Significant at 1%, 5% level57
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Indonesia Korea Thailand Japan
Period
Mean Stdv Mean Stdv Mean Stdv Mean Stdv
Pre-Crisis 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.25 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.64
Post-Crisis 0.05 1.53 0.01 0.43 0.04 0.52 0.68 0.84
Note: Figures indicate mean and standard deviation of percent changes in exchange rate
of local currency against the U.S. dollar.
Table2B.                         Volatility Change
Indonesia Korea Thailand Japan
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Depreciation(A) 0.14 1.07 0.20 0.34 0.07 0.36 0.46 0.48
Appreciation(B) 0.12 1.17 0.18 0.28 0.07 0.38 0.46 0.52
A/B 1.67** 0.91 1.11*** 1.21* 1.0 0.95 1.0 0.92
Note : (i) Figure indicates standard deviation of daily changes in exchange rates.
     (ii) * :58
Table 3.             GARCH Estimation of Volatility Shift
Variables Korea Indonesia Thailand
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Note:*,** : Significant at 1%, 5% level
Table4.           Volatility of Portfolio Capital Flows
Indonesia Korea Thailand
Absolute Rate of Changes 2.5 8.6 14.7
Absolute Changes 3.1 2.2 0.9
  
Note:  i) Figures indicate ratios of standard deviation in post-crisis period to the
corresponding statistics in pre-crisis.
      ii) pre-crisis : 1995:05 - 1997:04
        post-crisis : 1999:01 - 2000:12
      iii) In case of Indonesia, quarterly data are used due to the limited availability of
monthly data.59
Table5.                 Financial Integration with U.S.










Note : i) Figures indicate correlation coefficients of daily rates.
Table6.                   Foreign Reserves/Short-term Debt
Indonesia Korea Thailand Taiwan China Chile
1998. IV 0.89 1.31 1.15 5.24 4.37 1.68
1999. II 1.45 1.43 1.53 6.46 5.75 1.52
1999. IV 1.33 1.69 2.23 6.24 7.75 2.06
2000. I 1.38 2.19 2.21 6.53 7.45 1.67
2000. II 1.32 2.06 2.32 7.43 7.28 1.63
2000. III 1.35 2.14 2.72 7.33 7.63 1.4160










1996 34,037 6.5 -23,005 -4.4
1997 20,368 4.2 -8,167 -1.7
1998 51,975 16.2 40,365 12.6
1999 73,987 17.8 24,477 5.9
2000 96,131 21.0 11,040 2.4
2001(f)¹ 105,191 23.5 6,000 1.3
2002(f) 119,323 23.9 2,000 0.4
¹ estimates by the International Institute of Finance
Source : Institute of International Finance, Inc and the Central Bank Website
Table8A.                           Degree of Intervention
Indonesia Korea Thailand
B-E G-W B-E G-W B-E G-W
Pre-crisis 0.92 0.91 0.80 0.77 0.95 0.94
Post-
crisis
0.66 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.74 0.7661
Table8B.            Volatility of international Reserve and Interest Rate
International Reserves Interest Rates
Indonesia Korea Thailand Indonesia Korea Thailand
Pre-crisis 2.85 3.92 2.09 1.22 1.05 2.42
Post-
crisis
5.34 1.78 2.24 2.96 0.23 0.37
Table 8C.           Conditional Probability of Intervention
The ratio of depreciation
(appreciation)for three





  Depreciation 0.62 0.58
  appreciation 0.39 0.29
Korea
  Depreciation 0.56 0.50
  appreciation 0.53 0.46
Thailand
  Depreciation 0.52 0.43
  appreciation 0.36 0.41
Conditional Probability ; Detrended Series
The ratio of depreciation
(appreciation)for three





  Depreciation 0.62 0.53
  appreciation 0.47 0.59
Korea
  Depreciation 0.55 0.44
  Appreciation 0.45 0.45
Thailand
  Depreciation 0.54 0.36
  Appreciation 0.39 0.4662
Table 9.           Summary of Daily Change in Foreign Shocks











(%p) Absolute Changes in U.S. Interest Rate
Average 0.79 0.17 0.42 0.11
stdv.
3) 0.50 0.27 0.22 0.14
(%) Absolute Changes in Yen-Dollar Rate
Average 0.67 0.19 0.75 0.24
Stdv. 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.22
(%) Absolute Changes in U.S. Stock Prices
Average 0.72 0.24 1.06 0.37
stdv. 0.20 0.21 0.32 0.32
Source: Bloomberg
Note: 1) May 1, 1995-April 30, 1997
2) November 1, 1998-October 31, 2000
3) Standard deviation63
Table 10.        Effects of Foreign Shocks on Domestic Interest Rates
A. Shocks from U.S. Interest Rate
Independen
t
Fixed or Managed Floating                   Free Floating
Dependent Variables













































































































' 2 f t+ D 0.129
(0.145)
Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level64
B. Shocks from U.S. Stock Prices
Independen
t
Fixed or Managed Floating               Free Floating
Dependent Variables





















































































































Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level65
C. Shocks from Yen-Dollar Exchange Rates
Independen
t
Fixed or Managed Floating               Free Floating
Dependent Variables




















































































































Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level66
Table 5.  Effects of Foreign Shocks on Domestic Interest Rates: Dummy Approach
A. Shocks from U.S. Interest Rate
Independe
nt
Fixed or Managed Floating               Free Floating
Dependent Variables



































































































































Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level67
B.  Shocks from U.S. Stock Prices
Independen
t
Fixed or Managed Floating               Free Floating
Dependent Variables



































































































































Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level68
C.  Shocks from Yen-Dollar Exchange Rates
Independen
t
Fixed or Managed Floating               Free Floating
Dependent Variables





























































































































Note: **, *** : Significant at 5%, 10% level69
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